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Introduction  
The  introduction of directly-elected ‘Police and Crime Commissioners’ (PCCs) by the Conservative 
party-led coalition government formed in 2010 was hailed as the most significant change to the 
structures for the governance of police forces in England and Wales since the Police Act of 1964 (e.g. 
see Jones, Newburn and Smith, 2012; Raine and Keasey, 2012; Lister, 2013). The government 
claimed that the change would ensure that the Police were held ‘democratically’ accountable to 
local communities rather than ‘bureaucratically’ accountable to Whitehall (Herbert, 2011). Inevitably 
this prompted comment from politicians, the media, campaign groups, academics and the Police 
themselves. Much of the comment focused on the potential for the Police to become increasingly 
‘politicised’ and for PCCs to threaten key liberal safeguards such as the ‘operational independence’ 
of the Police (e.g. see ACPO, 2010; Joyce, 2011; Farthing, 2012; Millen and Stephens, 2012; Lister, 
2013), whilst the widely predicted poor turnout for ill-timed and underfunded elections became the 
focus of much subsequent criticism (see Garland and Terry, 2012). However, some cautiously 
welcomed the demise of the low visibility, and often low impact, oversight provided by the old 
police authorities, expressing an interest in whether the introduction of PCCs had the potential to 
nurture more creative experimentation in the area of public engagement (e.g. see Loader, 2014), 
and perhaps even allow more socially progressive approaches to policing to emerge (e.g. see Loader 
and Muir, 2011; Reiner, 2013).  
The introduction of PCCs seemed initially to offer an opportunity to revisit and rework some classic 
debates from the 1980s about police governance and accountability. These debates took place 
against a backdrop of significant social and political divisions and social unrest that often fed into 
intense disagreement between police authorities and ‘their’ Chief Constables about the appropriate 
use of police resources (see Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984; Spencer, 1985; Simey, 1988). However, 
rekindling and advancing the often rather incendiary debates of that era has not proven to be 
central to scholarly considerations of PCCs thus far. Instead, for the most part discussion and analysis 
of PCCs has focused on somewhat more prosaic matters, such as critiquing the conduct of the PCC 
elections (Berman, Coleman and Taylor, 2012; Garland and Terry, 2012); tracing the history and 
underlying rationales of reforms of police governance (Joyce, 2011; Newburn, 2012; Raine and 
Keasey, 2012; Davies, 2014; Gilling, 2014); considering whether Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) can 
effectively hold PCCs to account (Chambers, 2014; Lister, 2014); and examining whether PCCs will 
impinge upon ‘operational independence’ (Lister, 2013; Winsor, 2013). All of these matters are of 
course important when it comes to understanding aspects of the impact of this particular policy, but 
they do not and cannot amount to a meaningful engagement with the politics of policing or what we 
might mean when we refer to ‘democratic policing’. Ironically, then, a policy which was allegedly 
problematic because it would ‘politicise’ policing has, thus far, attracted few explicitly political 
analysesi.   
As Lister and Rowe (2014: 15) have observed:  
‘a troubling aspect of the new governance model is that it risks conflating appeals for 
“democratic policing” with an unhelpfully narrow set of electoral arrangements. Whether 
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enhanced local accountability of the Police is provided through a directly elected office is 
clearly an important consideration for those who wish to nurture democratic policing. It is 
not, however, the only criterion against which the democratic credentials of policing 
should be measured’  
Responding to this conflation of election-based arrangements for the governance of local police with 
‘democratic policing’ more generally, this chapter makes some proposals for a more ambitious and 
extensive (re)imagining of what we mean when we talk about ‘democratic policing’.  
The purpose of the chapter is to provoke reflection and debate on whether the aspiration towards 
‘democratic policing’ requires an expansion and reorientation of the study of policing. The chapter is 
structured as follows. Firstly I outline the case for a social justice-based conception of ‘democratic 
policing’. Secondly I consider some definitions of policing, and identify a safety-based definition as 
most useful for thinking about ‘democratic policing’ as policing for social justice. Thirdly I make some 
proposals for reorienting the study of policing by including a broader range of scholarship within the 
mainstream, and by decentring the police organisation by challenging key elements of police 
mythology. I conclude with proposals for further research in three areas: (i) identifying threats to 
social justice; (ii) addressing the forms of policing most appropriate for addressing these threats; and 
(iii) considering what does the police’s ‘capacity for decisive action’ makes them particularly good 
(and bad) for in contemporary society.  
Beyond elections: for a social justice-based understanding of ‘democratic policing’ 
What exactly we mean by ‘democracy’ has long been the subject of intense debate. Whilst some 
politicians and citizens in the Western world have often adopted a fairly complacent stance, seeing 
‘democracy’ as something that ‘we’ have achieved but which has yet to be achieved in other parts of 
the world (Arblaster, 1994), many campaign groups and political theorists are much less sanguine 
about the extent to which we should see extant social and political arrangements in Western 
societies as adequately democratic. As Reiner (2013) has pointed out in his own discussion of the 
introduction of PCCs there are good reasons for wondering whether we are currently experiencing a 
period of plutocratic rule ‘of the rich, by the rich, for the rich’. Meanwhile, Crouch (2004) suggests 
that we are living in a time of ‘post-democracy’, where the traces of democracy remain in our ways 
of thinking and talking about our political system, but where in reality citizens have few 
opportunities and extremely limited power to shape the kinds of societies in which they are living.  
To provide a convincing account of the kinds of principles, practices and institutional structures that 
might be appropriate for democracy it is useful first to reflect upon why it is that we think we ought 
to favour it. For some the answer might simply be that legitimate authority over people can only be 
exercised with the consent of those same people. We should favour democracy, then, because it is 
the most rational way to assign authority. However others have suggested somewhat more positive 
reasons for valuing democracy. Young (2000) argues that we favour and value democracy because it 
is seen as the best means we have to promote the self-development and self-determination of 
peoples which are essential to social justice. Democracy and justice then are seen to be mutually 
dependent, neither being possible without the presence of the other.  
A view of democracy as inextricably entwined with justice is evident in some recent attempts to 
identify the characteristics of ‘democratic policing’. For example, both Jones et al (1994) and 
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Manning (2010) argue that whether or not police officers act fairly and equitably in their dealings 
with the public, and whether policing is supporting the production of socially just outcomes, are as, 
if not more, important for democratic policing, than the kinds of mechanisms in place to ensure that 
the Police are responsive to ‘public opinion’. Indeed, one of the primary concerns articulated about 
the switch to PCCs has been a concern that police forces will have to respond to majoritarian 
pressures by adopting superficially appealing populist approaches that are detrimental to unpopular 
minorities and thus to social justice more broadly. Wood (2014) suggests that the potential for such 
a situation to occur demonstrates the existence of a clear tension between ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ 
values, and highlights the need to ensure that the balance between the two is carefully struck. 
However, as Wood acknowledges, this apparent tension rests on a rather narrow understanding of 
democracy as ‘electoralism’. So the kind of ‘democratic pressures’ which Wood refers to might, 
perhaps, be better understood as pressures emanating from an electoral system which is only 
superficially democratic (and may even be, in Crouch’s (2004) term, ‘post-democratic’).          
If we adopt a conception of democracy which treats an orientation towards social justice as 
fundamental (as proposed by Young (2000)) then we can avoid at least some of the apparent tension 
between so-called ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ values pointed to by Wood (2014). In Young’s (2000) 
theory of democracy decision-making rests on the equal inclusion of all those affected by a decision 
in some form of discussion and deliberation about the matter at stake. The deliberation must, in 
Young’s account, be free from domination and be carried out by participants who are oriented 
towards giving reasons for their views and preferences and taking into account the views and 
preferences of the other participants. Justice is ‘built in’ to this process because participants will 
inevitably have to appeal to some kind of ‘principles of justice’ in order to construct legitimate 
arguments about what should be done.  For Young, the whole purpose of the process of democratic 
communication, then, is ‘the transformation of private self-regarding desire into public appeals to 
justice’ (Young, 2000: 51). Similarly, Dryzek (2000: 46-47) suggests that when participants in 
deliberation must publicly defend their positions they will know that they must do so with respect to 
the public interest, rather than their own self-interest, and therefore they must present themselves 
as ‘public-spirited’. This may have the effect of making them become more ‘public-spirited’ in order 
to maintain their own sense of their integrity.  
What Young and Dryzek’s accounts of deliberative forms of democracy make available to us is a way 
of understanding democracy as not merely something which citizens have a right to expect, but also 
as something which imposes responsibilities on them.  There is no room in a democracy for the 
adoption of policies and practices which are unduly oppressive and clearly detrimental to the 
interests of unpopular or vulnerable minorities purely on the basis that such policies and practices 
reflect the self-interested (and frequently unreflective and under-informed) preferences of the 
majority. Under the more deeply democratic conditions of inclusive, non-dominated deliberation, 
the expression of self-interested preferences is considered to be an illegitimate form of political 
persuasion and the views and preferences of minorities and vulnerable groups must be taken into 
account. Democracy is identified with the pursuit via inclusive mechanisms of just solutions to the 
problems which arise under social and political conditions of diversity and value pluralism, rather 
than with the aggregation of individualised, self-interested preferences. Social justice, in the sense of 
people having equal opportunities to thrive and develop and to play a part in determining the 
conditions of their own existence, is seen as an essential component of democracy (Young, 2000: 31-
2).      
4 
 
The identification of democracy with social justice provides a useful starting point for thinking more 
imaginatively about what democratic policing might mean. It supports Manning’s (2010) claim that 
policing should at the very least not exacerbate already existing inequalities or compound the 
disadvantages experienced by the most vulnerable. Furthermore, as observed by both Manning 
(2010) and Jones et al (1994), democratic policing must clearly be effective at combatting those 
social ills which damage both the life experiences of individuals and communities and the fabric of 
democracy itself. Whilst responsiveness to citizens is an important aspect of ‘democratic policing’, 
then, so too are matters of fairness and practical efficacy in securing the necessities for social justice. 
To summarise, by drawing on radical deliberative theories of democracy we can arrive at a much 
broader and more ambitious conception of what ‘democratic policing’ might mean, and transcend 
the limitations of narrow election-centred approaches. Following this line of reasoning through to its 
conclusion, then, ‘democratic policing’ refers to policing which first and foremost provides effective 
support for social justice, a condition where citizens have equal opportunities to thrive and develop 
and to play a part in determining the circumstances of their own existence (Young, 2000). Next I 
identify a definition of ‘policing’ which will prove useful for thinking about ‘democratic policing’ as 
policing which is supportive of social justice.  
Policing, police and the creation of public safety 
Historically the word ‘police’ referred to something much more expansive than an organisation for 
controlling crime and maintaining order. It was associated with the notion of a system for ordering 
and managing a well-run society (Reiner, 1992; Neocleous, 2000). The advent of modern police 
organisations has led to a narrowing of the meaning of the words police and policing, coupled with a 
chronic ambiguity in their usage. Some uses of the words policing and police encourage a frustrating 
circularity in definition, implying that ‘policing’ is simply whatever ‘the police’ do, and whatever ‘the 
police’ do is ‘policing’ii.  In recent years sociologists working in this area have sought to make a clear 
theoretical distinction between the activity of ‘policing’ and the institution ‘the police’ (e.g. see 
Rawlings, 2002; McLaughlin, 2007; Reiner, 2010) as it is increasingly suggested that there has been a 
‘transformation’ or ‘pluralization’ of policing (see Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Loader, 2000; Jones 
and Newburn, 2002; White and Gill, 2013) with public police organizations described by some as 
having lost their ‘monopoly’ on policing (e.g. see Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Crawford, 2008). Whilst 
there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which the apparent trends should be regarded as 
novel (and, indeed, threatening) what is not in dispute is that it is possible, and frequently 
theoretically desirable, to draw a distinction between the activity of ‘policing’ and the organization 
‘the Police’.  
McLaughlin (2007: 113) suggests that under the unstable, fragmented and fragmenting conditions of 
postmodernity, critical police scholars must recognise that ‘“[p]olicing” is a socially necessary 
function but a state-structured police bureaucracy is not’. In fact, it seems to me, when we reclaim 
the activity of ‘policing’ from the institution of ‘the police’ we can start to think more creatively 
about what we should, as citizens of a democracy, be able to expect from both the activity and the 
state institution. Reiner’s (2010: 5) definition of the term ‘policing’ as referring to systems of 
surveillance and detection linked to the threat of sanction where deviant behaviour is discovered 
can potentially encompass a range of institutional arrangements for regulating conduct, including 
institutions outside of the state police organization. An even wider definition is provided by Bayley 
and Shearing (1996: 586), who refer to policing as ‘the self-conscious process whereby societies 
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designate and authorize people to create public safety’. Clearly this ‘process’ may well encompass 
the systems of surveillance referred to by Reiner, but what Bayley and Shearing’s definition adds is 
that it explicitly aligns policing with the production of an identifiable ‘good’, which is to say the 
production of ‘safety’. And it is in this broad definition of policing, as oriented towards safety that I 
think we can start to find the means to reimagine ‘democratic policing’.  
I have argued above that we should understand democracy as intrinsically linked to social justice. As 
such, if we accept Bayley and Shearing’s definition of ‘policing’ then we can identify ‘democratic 
policing’ with the creation of ‘safety’ from the kinds of things which threaten individual self-
development and/or the capacity of communities to determine their own destinies. This is, to be 
sure, a very far-reaching definition of safety, and one which overflows both the definition suggested 
by Bayley and Shearing (1996), and the more limited expectations people generally have of the 
public policeiii. However if we are serious about reimagining democratic policing along social justice 
lines it seems to me that we must develop a more expansive conception of what Bayley and 
Shearing (Ibid: 593) refer to as ‘the “bottom line” of safety’.   
This more expansive definition resonates with the term ‘human security’ coined by the United 
Nations Development Programme to capture ‘the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who 
sought security in their daily lives’ (UNDP, 1994: 22). The concept of ‘human security’ has been 
criticised for, amongst other things, being ‘extraordinarily expansive and vague’ (Paris, 2001: 88), 
however it does have the advantage of recognising that harm can take many forms, and that the 
types of worries and travails which loom large in many people’s everyday lives are frequently not 
associated with intentionally-inflicted criminal harms, but rather with difficulties accessing, 
maintaining access to, and feeling secure in one’s access to personal, material, social and political 
resources and rights (for example adequate incomes, paid work, shelter, food, health care, a healthy 
environment, basic human rights, freedom from state repression). Reimagining the ‘ “bottom line” 
of safety’ in ‘human security’ terms decouples ‘safety’ from ‘crime’, and also emphasises that 
‘policing’ (the creation of ‘safety’) can take place in the absence of ‘the police’. In a way, then, this 
reverts to the broader understanding of policing evident in historical usage of the term. This links 
‘policing’ through an expanded conception of ‘safety’ to the broad definition of ‘democratic policing’ 
(as orientated towards social justice) which I have outlined above. In the next part of this chapter I 
make some proposals for reorienting the study of policing in order to accommodate the expanded 
definition of policing proposed above. 
(Re)imagining democratic policing: reorienting the study of policing 
Research on policing and the police has embraced a range of approaches, which have been adopted 
for a variety of reasons, by researchers with very different intellectual and political objectives 
(Manning, 2005; McLaughlin, 2007; Reiner, 2010). In recent years, a great deal of research has been 
preoccupied with ‘evidence-based policing’ and in particular with identifying ways in which the 
police can be effective at ‘crime control’ (Reiner, 2010). This trend has seen ‘critical and theoretical’ 
research take a back seat to research which is ‘pragmatic [and] policy-oriented’ (Reiner, 1992: 55; 
2010: 14). Yet, as Reiner (1992: 777) has noted, the recurring crises of legitimacy and identity 
experienced by the police from the latter part of the 20th century onwards have come about as a 
result of ‘deeply rooted structural trends’ which require critical, sociological analysis.  Under these 
conditions, McLaughlin (2007: ix, emphasis added) suggests, ‘it has never been more important to 
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forge a critical police studies … capable of conceptualizing policing developments against socio-
cultural, economic and political transformations’. This project seems all the more urgent if 
‘democratic policing’ is to be successfully (re)imagined along the lines outlined above.  
In this part of the chapter I argue that to pursue ‘democratic policing’ in the sense of policing for 
social justice, the study of policing needs to be reoriented in at least two ways. Firstly, a wider range 
of perspectives, topics and approaches need to be brought into mainstream discussions of policing. 
Secondly (and relatedly), the hierarchical, uniformed, state bureaucracies which we call ‘police’ need 
to be decentred from the study of policing, and the mythology which surrounds these organisations 
needs to be dismantled. 
‘Policing for a Better Britain’? Broadening the horizons of policing scholarship 
Published in November 2013, Policing for a Better Britain (Stevens, 2013) was the final report of the 
‘Independent Commission on Policing’ set up by the Labour party to ‘examine the roles and 
responsibilities of the Police service in England and Wales’iv. Chaired by a former Commissioner of 
the Metropolitan Police (Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington), the commission was, perhaps, always 
unlikely to deliver any major surprises or departures from the status quo in its findings or 
recommendations. Yet, the final report did turn out to be rather striking in terms of the issues it left 
largely unexamined. The report made only rather limited reference to matters including police 
violence, routine weaponisation (e.g. the increased use of Tasars), deaths in police custody or 
following contact with the police, police manipulation of and apparent failures to investigate the 
media (e.g. historic revelations in relation to Hillsborough and more recent allegations in relation to 
the Metropolitan Police investigation of News International), the policing of protest events (e.g. 
student fees and anti-fracking protests), police involvement in the surveillance of peace and 
environmental campaigners, and the apparently close relationships between the police and various 
private business concerns and interest groups (e.g. see Ball, 2013; Lewis and Evans, 2013; The 
Guardian, 2013; Whyte, 2015). These issues, and the structural political and organisational contexts 
within which they have arisen, all seem to be highly relevant for a thoroughgoing discussion of what 
‘democratic policing’ should and should not involve.   
One can speculate about a range of causes for the omissions in the final report of the Stevens’ 
Commission (2013), but what seems clear is that those who have contributed to the Commission’s 
final report have not been minded to make explicit reference to the structural context within which 
the inquiry took place. As a result, the deep social divisions and inequalities of wealth and power 
which place limits on the extent to which ordinary citizens are able to exert any meaningful influence 
over the broad ideological and material conditions under which they must live their lives, are 
rendered largely invisible. Furthermore, the Police-centric focus of the work of the Commission has 
meant that those who have contributed to its final form have avoided any overt challenge to the 
notion that state police organizations in roughly their current form are necessary, and that their 
myriad objectives (the so-called ‘omnibus role’) are, broadly speaking, legitimate.  
Ensuring that policing is ‘democratic’ is treated in the Commission report (Stevens, 2013) (and in the 
companion volume of academic papers (see Brown, 2014) which helped inform its production) as a 
matter of implementing the most appropriate legal frameworks for governance and accountabilityv. 
This approach indicates the broadly ‘liberal constitutionalist’ (cf. Kinsey, Lea and Young, 1986: 164) 
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orientations underpinning the report, which include a consensus view of society, a commitment to a 
view of both the police and the law as politically impartial and an assumption that the state police 
organisation as currently constituted is an essential and legitimate institution and should form the 
starting point for studying policing. The liberal orientations described above combine to produce a 
number of quite significant blind spots (or perhaps more accurately ‘dark corners’) in the 
mainstream of policing scholarship.    
To avoid being accused of using a broad brush to paint a straw-man I should clarify that I am not 
suggesting that liberal policing scholarship has not provided and cannot provide genuinely important 
and interesting insights into contemporary policing and police organizations, including criticisms of 
aspects of police activity and of the institutional structure of policing. Indeed, quite the opposite: 
some research falling within this tradition has provided important conceptual resources and 
empirical insights that enable us to move towards a more fully developed conceptualisation of 
‘democratic policing’ (and examples have been referred to above). Rather, what I wish to suggest is 
that the criticisms of the police which emerge from the liberal tradition of policing scholarship are, 
conspicuously, not placed in the context of the structural conditions of neo-liberal capitalism that 
create and maintain the injustices, harms, inequalities and social divisions which render policing an 
intensely and inherently political activity. Thus, whilst it has yielded significant and useful empirical 
and conceptual gains, the overall product of liberal policing scholarship as a tradition remains, I 
suggest, on its own inadequate to the task of (re)imagaining ‘democratic policing’ in the manner 
which I have proposed.    
However, whilst the broadly liberal orientations described above characterise many of the dominant 
voices raised in mainstream British policing scholarship this is not to say that nobody is challenging 
the picture they paint, or attempting to shine a light into the dark corners of policing to which they 
give only a rather cursory glance. Indeed, some academics (as well as campaign groups and 
journalists) have long sought to point out the significant harms and humiliations caused to some 
vulnerable and marginalised groups by police activity (and inactivity) (e.g. see Scraton, 1982; 
Choongh, 1998; Pemberton, 2005; Tombs and Whyte, 2007; Tombs, 2008) to highlight repressive 
and intrusive police interventions in political protest movements (e.g. see Power, 2012; Evans and 
Lewis, 2013; Jackson and Monk, 2014), and to reveal the extent to which the police, and policing 
more broadly conceived, have been involved in serving the interests of powerful establishment 
groups as opposed to the wider public (e.g. see Whyte, 2015).  
The problem, then, is not that critical research is not taking place, or that critical insights are not 
coming to light, rather it is that these are not being adequately taken into account by the 
mainstream of policing scholarship. There are, it seems to me, two ways in which this occurs. Firstly, 
where critical research focuses on things which the police do which we might think they should not 
be doing (for example causing the deaths of citizens or protecting corporate interests by spying on 
trade unionists and environmental activists), mainstream liberal policing scholars have shown a 
tendency to carry on regardless, without engaging with the ways in which police violence and 
subversion of democratic rights undermine the institution’s putative legitimacy and impartiality (a 
tendency which pervades the report of the Stevens’ commission (2013), and the accompanying 
academic volume (Brown, 2014). Secondly, some scholars providing critical insights of relevance to 
policing but which may concern aspects of policing in which the police are not directly concerned are 
not actually seen (sometimes even by themselves) as ‘policing’ scholars. As a result of both these 
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tendencies, it seems, research which could pose a robust evidence-based challenge to liberal 
assumptions about the necessity and general righteousness of the state police in roughly their 
current form, or about the health of our democracy, is permitted to languish in a critical (or as some 
have called it, ‘Left-Idealist’ (Kinsey, Lea and Young, 1986: 164)) ghetto. This is to the significant 
detriment of discussions about ‘democratic policing’.  
One salient example of the second way in which mainstream policing scholarship neglects relevant 
research can be found in the work of Steve Tombs and Dave Whyte, who have written extensively on 
the death and damage caused by ‘safety crimes’ (see Tombs and Whyte, 2007; Tombs, 2008). These 
crimes are, they note, treated as a ‘sub-category’ of criminal offences which are usually dealt with 
through regulatory agencies, rather than by the police. As such they tend not to be seen as ‘real 
crime’ (Tombs and Whyte, 2007: 93). Correspondingly, it seems, the empirical and theoretical 
insights provided by Tombs and Whyte tend not to be seen as insights which are specifically about 
policing or the police, and neither of these researchers would, I suspect, consider themselves to be 
policing scholars per se. However, if, as I have proposed above, the primary objective of ‘democratic 
policing’ should be the creation of forms of safety which enable human development and self-
determination then the insights provided by research such as that carried out by Whyte and Tombs 
most certainly are relevant for a thorough reimagining of what ‘democratic policing’ might mean.  
Acknowledging the breadth and variety of research both on, and of relevance to, policing and the 
police, even where that research may chip away at treasured liberal assumptions about society, 
democracy and the police, is an essential starting point for thinking deeply and critically about 
‘democratic policing’. However, broadening the horizons of policing research in the way outlined 
here requires a quite fundamental adjustment in the current position of the police in relation to 
policing research. It requires nothing less than decentring the police by cracking open the 
mythological carapace which has kept them centre stage for so long.   
Decentring the police: counteracting police mythology 
The symbolic importance of the police is premised upon an assemblage of myths which provide 
cover for both their inadequacies and their excesses and limit the influence of the kind of radical 
criticism needed to (re)imagine both their role, and policing more generally. Preeminent amongst 
these myths is the characterisation of the police as having been established in order to deal with 
rising crime, and as having been primarily concerned with this task throughout their history and right 
up to the present day. Along with this preeminent mythological cloak come various additional 
mythological accoutrements, including the notion that the police are politically impartial because 
their activity is shaped by the law rather than by special interests and the belief that the police can 
control crime effectively without generating undesirable side-effects in the shape of repressive and 
discriminatory practices with the potential to criminalise, alienate and otherwise injure already 
vulnerable and socially-excluded groups.     
The historical and contemporary accuracy of these myths has been repeatedly highlighted in the 
policing research literature (Reiner, 2010; Loader, 2014). Revisionist historical accounts of the 
emergence of the ‘new’ police in nineteenth century England (for example see Storch, 1976) suggest 
that rather than dealing with ‘crime’ per se police activities were frequently concerned with 
curtailing those activities of the labouring classes which were regarded as disruptive to good order, 
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good taste and good working habits as viewed from the perspective of the middle and upper classes.  
Twentieth century sociologists, meanwhile, have long argued that in their day to day work the police 
are not first and foremost either law enforcers or ‘crime-fighters’ (e.g. see Banton, 1964; Manning, 
1977; Bayley, 1994; Bittner, 2005 [1974]; Dixon, 2005; Westley, 2005 [1970]; Loader, 2014)vi.  
Bayley (1994: 20) argues that uniformed ‘patrol officers’ are primarily engaged in responding to calls 
for assistance from the public, using the threat of law enforcement to ‘interrupt or pacify situations 
of potential or ongoing conflict’. The fact that police can invoke the law, and that their legal powers 
facilitate the use of force in order to gain compliance with their instructions, means that they have 
what Bittner (2005 [1974]: 164-5) calls ‘a unique and powerful capacity to cope with all kinds of 
emergencies’. The law, then, is not something which provides a specific direction for police work 
rather it provides the police with certain capacities which shape public demand for their services. As 
Westley (2005 [1970]: 138) notes the police are ‘a group who can be assigned that which no other 
group can perform’, namely intervening in situations where ‘decisive action’ is required (Bittner, 
2005 [1974]).  
Even a report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC, 2012), for all that it gamely 
represents itself as contradicting sociological orthodoxy in order (presumably) to bolster the Home 
Secretary’s promise ‘to turn police into real crime fighters’ (May, 2011), indicates that police officers 
in England and Wales still spend a good deal of their time attending incidents in which no crime has 
in fact occurred. Indeed, one of the report’s ‘key findings’ is that police overwhelmingly spend their 
time ‘on crime or stopping things that the public feel are dangerous or wrong and should cease 
immediately’ (HMIC, 2012). Whether or not this is a deliberate echo of Bittner’s (2005 [1974]: 161) 
famous claim that police attend incidents which involve ‘something-that-ought-not-to-be-
happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-right-now!’ is not clear, though the 
similarity is striking.  
What we know about the effectiveness of police activity at reducing crime is also less than 
convincing, with a recent review suggesting that there is no conclusive evidence that ‘traditional’ 
tactics of random patrol, stop and search and rapid response have any effect at all on crime (Karn, 
2013). Attempts to develop and test approaches which will allow the police to be more effective at 
reducing crime (for example targeting ‘hotspots’, intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing and 
partnership working) are argued to have shown some potential (Karn, 2013), but one might wonder 
whether the resources which are currently being expended on ‘evidence-based policing’ are better 
understood as a welcome and rational development, or as a desperate bid to find a way in which the 
police can finally live up to their own mythology. Certainly it seems likely that the enthusiastic 
championing of evidence-based policing by police leaders, politicians and academics will do little to 
dissuade the public from what Loader (1997: 11) refers to as their ‘affective attachment to the 
“policing solution”’. Indulging this attachment keeps the police at the centre of debates about 
policing, crime and safety, their enduring ‘symbolic power’ stifling attempts to find alternate ‘ways 
of speaking and acting vis-á-vis crime and social order’ (Ibid).        
But, if the police are not effective at reducing crime, and are not primarily engaged in upholding the 
law or fighting crime, then we might well ask what are they doing and why does the mythology 
surrounding them suggest that they are doing something else? One plausible response to these 
questions can be found in the fact that portraying the police as crime fighters casts a veil over the 
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inherently political nature of police work which, in the end, always involves decisions about what, 
where, who and how to police. Resource constraints dictate that the suppression of crime and 
enforcement of law is always selective and ‘incomplete’ (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984). Thus, the 
law does not determine police action, but rather is used by police officers as a resource for pursuing 
objectives which they can, within limits, define for themselves (Bayley, 1994; Bittner, 2005 [1974]). 
Choongh (1998: 625) notes that these objectives can and often do include extracting what officers 
consider to be due deference from ‘subordinate sections of society viewed as anti-police and 
innately criminal’, in particular the poor, homeless people, unemployed people, ethnic minorities, 
gypsies and travellers. In fact, studies of police behaviour indicate that officers often use their own 
informal tests to determine which individuals require and deserve coercive attention. Their 
judgements are frequently based less on specific criminal behaviours than on visible markers of 
social status, or the failure of individuals to display sufficient respect towards officers’ authority (see 
Loftus, 2010). In other words, in their normal day to day routines the police act most frequently and 
visibly against some of the most disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalised sections of society, 
often in connection with quite trivial offences, or indeed no specific criminal offences at allvii.  
Meanwhile, the police are neither commonly expected nor regularly seen to act against the 
individuals and organisations responsible for causing some of the most far-reaching and catastrophic 
harms of everyday life in 21st century Britain, including companies who allow their workers to be 
seriously injured and killed, or the environment to be seriously degraded, by failing to adopt safe 
working practices (see Tombs, 2008), and the architects of the global financial crisis which has 
precipitated catastrophic cuts to vital social services in this country (prosecutions of the odd 
criminally-errant banker not withstanding). At the same time the police do act against those who 
seek to mount effective political campaigns highlighting social divisions, inequalities and 
environmental concerns. Recent examples of police activity in this area have included aggressive 
public order police responses to a succession of protests by student, anti-austerity and 
environmental campaignersviii and the ongoing series of revelations about close relationships 
between the police and private corporationsix, and the involvement of the police in extensive 
surveillance of activist groups and trade unionists (see Ball, 2013; Lewis and Evans, 2013; The 
Guardian, 2013; Whyte, 2015). In other words, there is strong evidence that the police often serve 
the interests of particular groups in society by concentrating resources and attention on 
apprehending the perpetrators of certain types of ‘crime’ and maintaining a particular, dominant, 
conception of order (Reiner, 2010).   
All of that being said, the police also intervene and take control in circumstances where it is hard to 
imagine which other group could do so. If we accept that their defining characteristic is their ‘right to 
use coercive force’ (Klockars, 1985: 12) we must acknowledge that their particular strength is their 
ability to take ‘decisive action’ which may not be opposed by citizens (Bittner, 1970: 40 cited by 
McLaughlin, 2007: 53). Of course, police can cause considerable harm in the course of behaving 
decisively, which is precisely why critical studies of the consequences of coercive and violent police 
action are essential for any consideration of ‘democratic policing’. But there are circumstances in 
which the police’s unique authorisation to use coercive force (and the knowledge that the public 
have of the police’s authorisation to use force) is essential in providing an effective response to an 
unfolding emergency. There is, then, still a need to value the public police, and accept that the public 
police perform some important social functions which few of us would wish to be without.  
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However, the continued centrality and symbolic importance of the police in discussions of policing 
serves to promote, make visible, and dramatize, a particular set of harms (intentionally-caused 
criminal harms) and a particular set of responses to those harms (police use of force, 
criminalisation). As well as failing to reflect what the police actually spend much of their time doing 
(dealing with calls for service from the public, resolving conflicts, asserting their authority over 
marginalised groups) this deflects attention away from both the overtly political ‘high policing’ (cf. 
Brodeur, 1983) functions of the police and from the harms (including corporate and state violence, 
exploitation, poverty, environmental degradation)  which are not generally considered to be police 
business (despite being potentially far more fundamental to the wellbeing of society). Thus, the 
symbolic dominance of the police over discussions of policing makes it difficult to broaden the 
horizons of these discussions in the ways I have proposed above. In order to pursue democratic 
policing, then, the activity of policing needs to be reclaimed from the literally and symbolically 
violent institution of the police.  
Conclusion: Towards a pro-democratic agenda for policing research  
In this chapter I have attempted to sketch the outlines for an ambitious (re)imagining of ‘democratic 
policing’. It clearly goes far beyond the rather limited aspiration to ‘democratise’ the Police via the 
ballot box, as adopted by the Coalition Government. It also, whilst clearly drawing on elements from 
the existing literature, goes beyond most previous proposals as to how to develop democratic 
policing, even those radical commentators of the 1980s who, although they favoured more 
participative approaches in police governance in order to ensure representation for the views of 
minority groups, were still rather Police-centric (see Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1996). I have 
attempted to weave together some radical democratic theory, with a social harm perspective on 
crime, with insights from more conventional policing sources. Undoubtedly it will be perceived as a 
challenge by those who are more or less content with the current constitution, both institutional and 
ideological, of policing, police organisations and, indeed, the broad field of police studies in this 
country. I hope however that it has suggested some possible fruitful areas for further research and 
analysis which may help to put flesh onto the bones of the ideas outlined here, and may even 
provide additional momentum to existing campaigns in favour of approaches to policing that 
promote rather than undermine social justice and democratic self-determination. To my mind there 
are three empirical research questions which should provide the backbone of any attempts to take 
this initial, preliminary exercise in (re)imagining further:  
(1) What are the main threats to safety, social justice and self-determination in today’s society? 
(2) What forms of policing are best suited to addressing these threats? 
(3) What does the public police’s ‘capacity for decisive action’ make them particularly good (and 
bad) for in society today? 
Clearly some of the evidence needed to start to address these questions is already available, but 
much more remains to be done. The objective here is to shift the analytical gaze away from the 
police (as fascinating as they are) and onto ‘safety’ as the ultimate product that we expect policing 
to deliver. The production of ‘safety’ is clearly a goal which one would hope is shared by police 
organisations, and therefore the suggested research agenda does not preclude collaboration with 
the police. Nonetheless it is an agenda which has the potential to yield some challenging and 
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unpalatable findings for police organisations. The question is whether police organisations, and the 
researchers who stake their careers on researching on, with and for them, are willing to consider 
whether, as Robert Peel suggested to parliament back in 1828, we now require ‘a new mode of 
protection’ (quoted in Critchley, 1967: 48).  
 
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Many thanks to Barry Goldson and Ian Loader for their very helpful feedback on 
the first draft of this chapter.  
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i
 Two exceptions to this are Reiner (2013) and Wood (2014). 
ii For example, the final report of the Independent Police Commission (Stevens, 2013) used the word ‘police’ in 
its title, stated that it was an ‘independent inquiry focusing on the future of policing’ in its subtitle, and then in 
further introductory text stated that its ‘overarching objective is to examine the roles and responsibilities of 
the Police service in England and Wales’. 
iii
 Indeed, if we consider Robert Peel’s statement (after the passage of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829) that ‘I 
want to teach people that liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organised gangs of thieves, 
and in leaving the principal streets of London in the nightly possession of drunken women and vagabonds’ 
(quoted in Critchley, 1967: 54), then we can see that Peel refers to a very specific and narrow conception of 
safety, and one which arguably provides only a rather limited amount of ‘liberty’.    
iv
 http://independentpolicecommission.org.uk/  
v
 The Labour party has since pledged to introduce the report’s final recommendations (Cooper, 2013), which 
include proposals for replacing PCCs with governance arrangements incorporating lower tier local authorities, 
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and possibly directly-elected Local Policing Boards and some form of ‘participatory budgeting’ involving local 
people. 
vi
 This formulation of their work is, as Manning (1977: 15) has argued, an ironic ‘legitimating theme’. It is ironic 
because the police’s manifest failure to either spend significant proportions of their time dealing with crime, or 
to make a clearly identifiable impact on the amount of crime means that ‘their stock is oversold’. 
vii
 To observe that the police are often concerned with rather trivial offences is certainly not to deny the 
considerable suffering that such offences can cause to individuals and communities, particularly those who 
experience them on a regular basis. 
viii
 For example, the use of mounted police charges and the controversial containment technique of ‘kettling’, 
against students protesting the rise in university tuition fees; the significant use of police resources and abuse 
of powers of arrest in order to disrupt protests against ‘hydraulic fracturing’ test sites in Manchester and 
Sussex; and the capacity of the police to use the offence of ‘aggravated trespass’ legislation as a way to 
criminalise peaceful but disruptive direct action. 
ix
 For example, following a peaceful direct action protest by environmental activists at the gas-fired West 
Burton power station there were allegations that the police passed papers relating to the case directly onto 
the owners EDF so that they could pursue civil action against them (Ball, 2013). Similarly, police dealing with 
protestors against the cull of Badgers in Gloucestershire were filmed stating that their details could be passed 
to the National Farmers Union to enable them to pursue a private prosecution (The Guardian, 2013).    
